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Abstract
We address the problem of deﬁning policies that may be used in the evaluation of requests made by client
actors, in the course of web-based e-trading, to perform actions on the resources maintained by the server
agents of an e-cooperative. An e-cooperative is a group of agents in cyberspace that may act individually
or in conjunction with other agents to satisfy a client’s request to act. Our principal contribution to this
key problem is to deﬁne formally an event-oriented model in terms of which policies may be speciﬁed for
helping to ensure that only legitimate forms of client actions are performed in the course of engaging in
e-trading via the web. We call this model the Event-oriented Web-based E-trading (EWE) model. Policies
deﬁned in terms of the EWE model are used to specify a set of actions that client actors can perform as a
consequence of the client having a particular status. We deﬁne the EWE model using a logic programming
language and we give examples of web-based e-trading policy representation, validation and evaluation.
Keywords: Web applications, e-trading, policies, logic speciﬁcation.
1 Introduction
One of the principal Web-based applications is e-trading. For such applications,
client interaction with Web services requires that complex policy speciﬁcations be
formally speciﬁed to deﬁne legitimate forms of interactions. For that, conceptual
models are required in terms of which web-based e-trading policies can be speciﬁed.
In this paper, we describe one such model and we show how web-based e-trading
policies may be formally speciﬁed in terms of this model. These policies may be
used in practice for managing web-based e-trading where (pre-authenticated) client
agents make requests for an action to be performed by a type of virtual organization
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that we call an e-cooperative. Informally, an e-cooperative is a collection of server
agents that exist in cyberspace and that may act individually or collaboratively in
order to satisfy a client’s request that some action be performed.
E-cooperatives implement business rules. For organizations to engage eﬀectively
in e-trading via the Web, business rules need to be formally speciﬁed in a high-
level language, which: permits properties to be proven of policies for veriﬁcation
purposes, allows changes to e-trading policies to be eﬀected autonomously, and
allows for the eﬃcient processing of client requests. To meet these requirements,
we use a logic language for the deﬁnition of a model and policies for web-based
e-trading. The logic language allows policy properties to be speciﬁed and proof-
theoretic principles enable these properties to be veriﬁed; operational semantics
exist for eﬃcient request evaluation with respect to policy speciﬁcations that are
expressed in terms of the logic language.
In the model that we deﬁne, server agent intentions and empowerments are
represented. Moreover, server agent decisions on whether to act to satisfy a client’s
request will depend on the client’s status. To capture these requirements, we propose
a new type of model of e-trading, which we call the event-oriented web-based e-
trading (EWE) model ; EWE policies can be speciﬁed in terms of the EWE model
for the control of client agent actions in the context of e-trading via the Web.
In the EWE model, a coordinator agent for the cooperative determines whether a
client’s requested action is permitted by considering the client’s ascribed status (e.g.,
the assignment of a client to a role) and a description of events relating to the client.
Permitted actions depend on the mode in which a server agent acts, individually or
cooperatively. When a server agent of an e-cooperative acts individually to satisfy a
client’s request then we say that the server agent acts in I-mode; when a server agent
must collaborate with other server agents in the e-cooperative to satisfy a client’s
request (with each server agent contributing to the satisfaction of the request) then
we say that the server agent acts in C-mode (cf. [17]). The distinction between
I-mode and C-mode acting by server agents motivates the need for a shared meta-
policy that determines how server agents may act individually or cooperatively to
service client agent requests and to what extent. For that, the notion of a group
ethos is used. In the C-mode case, a request by a client agent for an action to be
performed may be satisﬁed by the server agents of the e-cooperative subdividing
the request and satisfying part of the original request. We call this request slicing.
In order for a client’s action to be performed in I-mode or C-mode the action must
be consistent with the group ethos. To the best of our knowledge, the EWE model
is the ﬁrst formal model of e-trading that combines individual and collective actions
that are speciﬁed in terms of a meta-theory, a group ethos.
Despite being thus far relatively neglected, e-cooperatives and the policies that
they employ will become routinely used in the context of Internet and Semantic
Web technologies for e-trading. As an e-cooperative, a group of server agents may
be able to pool their resources, they may choose to subcontract a client’s request
for business reasons, and collections of server agents may decide to collaborate in
order to combine their individual strengths.
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The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2, we
describe some formal preliminaries. In Section 3, we describe e-cooperatives in more
detail and we informally describe our EWE model. In Section 4, we give the logical
axioms that deﬁne the EWE model. In Section 5, we describe the application-
speciﬁc, non-logical axioms and we discuss their use in EWE policy formulation.
In Section 6, we describe an implementation of our approach. In Section 7, we
discuss the related literature. In Section 8, conclusions are drawn and further work
is suggested.
2 Formal Preliminaries
In this section, we describe Identiﬁcation-based Logic Programs (IBLPs). IBLPs are
an annotated form of logic programs that allow distributed information sources to
be speciﬁed in formulations of web-based e-trading policies. IBLPs are based on a
syntactic variant of normal logic programs.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A normal clause is a formula of the form (m ≥ 0, n ≥ 0):
A← A1, . . . , Am, not Am+1, . . . , not Am+n.
A normal logic program is a set of normal clauses.
The head A of the clause in Deﬁnition 2.1, and each Ai (1 ≤ i ≤ m+n), are
atoms. In the body of the clause, A1, . . . , Am, not Am+1, . . . , not Am+n, the atoms
A1, . . . , Am are called ‘positive literals’, and not Am+1, . . . , not Am+n are ‘negative
literals’; not denotes negation-as-failure. A clause with an empty body (i.e., of the
form A←) is a fact. In what follows, we usually omit the arrow when writing facts,
writing A ← as A. The term rule refers to a clause with a non-empty body. The
literals in the body of the clause are also referred to as ‘conditions’. We denote
variables in clauses by using symbols that start with a letter in the upper case; we
denote constants by using symbols that start with a letter in the lower case.
In an IBLP, each atom in the body of a clause is annotated with the name of
a uniquely identiﬁable module, which may be stored on any ﬁle server. Uniform
resource identiﬁers (URIs) provide a unique global identity for referencing IBLPs
Deﬁnition 2.2 An identiﬁcation-based clause is a formula of the following form:
A← A1⇐υ1, . . . , Am⇐υm, not Am+1⇐υm+1,
. . . , not Am+n⇐υm+n (m ≥ 0, n ≥ 0).
where the head A and each Ai (1 ≤ i ≤ m + n) are atoms, and each υi (1 ≤ i ≤
m+ n) is a URI in R. An IBLP is a ﬁnite set of identiﬁcation-based clauses.
Informally, the semantics of ⇐ can be described thus. Let δ be a mapping
δ : R −→ {P1, . . . , Pn} where R is a set of URIs, and where each Pi (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
is an IBLP. The condition Ai⇐ υi is true (provable) iﬀ Ai is true (provable) with
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respect to the IBLP δ(υi), and not Ai⇐υi is true (provable) iﬀ Ai is not true (not
provable in ﬁnite time) with respect to δ(υi). We will make this informal semantics
more precise below, by means of a translation from IBLPs to normal logic programs.
Note however that the annotation Ai ⇐ υi has an operational meaning as well as
a logical meaning: whenever a query evaluation attempts execution of Ai ⇐ υi,
execution is passed to the (usually remote) server whose URI is υi.
We say that the atom A is deﬁned locally in υ when A is the head of a clause
in the IBLP δ(υ). If a literal of the form Ai⇐υ or not Ai⇐υ appears in the body
of a clause in δ(υ), then the module annotation can be omitted: Ai then stands for
Ai⇐υ (and not Ai for not Ai⇐υ).
Notice that a clause of the form A ← A⇐ υj in the IBLP δ(υi) deﬁnes A in
terms of its local deﬁnition in δ(υj). Operationally, execution of A in υi invokes the
execution of A in υj .
Standard comparison operators on numbers {=, =, <,>,≤,≥} and arithmetic
operators {+,−,×,÷} are assumed to be deﬁned locally for all IBLPs. We also
allow conditions of the form A⇐X and not A⇐X in clauses where X is a variable
that ranges over a (ﬁnite) domain of URIs. The meaning of a condition A⇐ X
(not A⇐X) in the body of an IBLP clause is that A⇐X (not A⇐X) is true if
and only if A is provable (not provable) from δ(υi) ∪ · · · ∪ δ(υj), where each υk
(i ≤ k ≤ j) identiﬁes an IBLP and υk can be substituted for X. We require that an
allowedness condition is satisﬁed by every clause c in an IBLP, to wit: every variable
in c must occur in a positive literal in the body of c. What is more, a substitution
for X must exist whenever an A⇐X or not A⇐X condition is evaluated.
Deﬁnition 2.3 Let R be a ﬁnite set of URIs and P1, . . . , Pn be IBLPs. An IBLP
conﬁguration is a pair (R, δ) where δ is a mapping δ : R −→ {P1, . . . , Pn}.
In order to simplify notation, in the remainder of the paper we will write υ for
the IBLP δ(υ) where context permits, and we will write υi := Pi to denote that the
IBLP conﬁguration assigns URI υi to the IBLP Pi, i.e, υi := Pi is shorthand for
δ(υi) =def Pi. In our examples, the set of URIs is usually obvious from context.
Next, we deﬁne the declarative semantics of IBLPs by means of a reduction
of IBLPs to normal logic programs. This reduction translates an IBLP P to a
normal logic program P ′ by replacing every occurrence of an atom p(t1, . . . , tk)⇐υ
by the atom p:υ(t1, . . . , tk) where p:υ is a new predicate symbol constructed by
concatenating p and υ. When P is an IBLP identiﬁed by υi, i.e., when δ(υi) = P , we
write Δυi for the normal logic program P ′ obtained by the reduction just described.
Deﬁnition 2.4 Let (R, δ) be an IBLP conﬁguration, and let υi be a URI in R.
Δυi denotes the normal logic program obtained by replacing every occurrence of an
atom of the form p(t1, . . . , tk)⇐υ in the IBLP δ(υi) by the atom p:υ(t1, . . . , tk).
Let R = {υ1, . . . , υn}. The reduction of (R, δ), written Δ(R, δ), is the normal
logic program Δυ1 ∪ · · · ∪Δυn.
This transformation reduces an IBLP to a normal logic program; hence, we can
adopt any of the standard semantics for normal logic programs as the declarative
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semantics for IBLPs. In this paper, we will employ the stable model semantics [3]
(also known as ‘answer sets’). The stable model of an IBLP will be deﬁned in terms
of the stable model of the normal logic program to which it translates.
Deﬁnition 2.5 Let (R, δ) be an IBLP conﬁguration. M is an identiﬁcation-based
(IB) stable model of (R, δ) iﬀ M is a stable model of the normal logic program
Δ(R, δ).
Let R = {υ1, . . . , υn} and υi ∈ R. The set of ground atoms
Mυi =def {p(c1, . . . , ck) | p:υi(c1, . . . , ck) ∈M}
is an identiﬁcation-based (IB) stable model of υi in the conﬁguration (R, δ).
We write M |=υi p(c1, . . . , ck) when p:υi(c1, . . . , ck) ∈ M. The satisfaction
relation |=υi is extended from atoms to formulas in the usual way. We sometimes
omit the subscript υi when it is obvious from context.
In this paper, we restrict attention to stratiﬁed conﬁgurations of IBLPs.
Deﬁnition 2.6 Let (R, δ) be an IBLP conﬁguration, and R = {υ1, . . . , υn}. (R, δ)
is stratiﬁed iﬀ the normal logic program Δ(R, δ) = Δυ1 ∪ · · · ∪ Δυn is stratiﬁed,
i.e., iﬀ the dependency graph [3] for Δυ1 ∪ · · · ∪Δυn is acyclic.
The syntactic restriction to a stratiﬁed conﬁguration of IBLPs guarantees that
the stable model [3] is unique. Moreover, the soundness of an operational semantics
for IBLPs will be the same as that for stratiﬁed logic programs and completeness
results are preserved in the absence of system-related failures.
3 Informal Preliminaries
In this section, we informally discuss the key features of the EWE model.
3.1 E-cooperatives
We ﬁrst describe an architecture for e-cooperatives. For the type of e-cooperative
that we assume, all requests are sent by a pre-authenticated requester (a client
agent) to a single coordinator agent for the e-cooperative. The e-cooperative typ-
ically includes multiple server agents. All clients and server agents are assumed
to be uniquely identiﬁed. The sets of client agents and server agents are disjoint.
The coordinator is neither a server agent of the e-cooperative nor a client of the
e-cooperative. The principal role of the coordinator is to manage indirectly all in-
teraction between the clients and the servers of the e-cooperative (e-cooperative
server agents do not directly communicate with each other or with clients). The
coordinator also manages matters like server agent membership of the e-cooperative
and the imposition of sanctions on server agents that act non-normatively in the
group context.
In overview, the simple architecture that we will henceforth assume for e-
cooperatives may be illustrated thus:
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ci . . . cj
↘↖ ↙↗

↙↗ ↘↖
sk . . . sl
Here, ci, . . . , cj are clients,  is the coordinator and sk, . . . , sl are the server agents
of the e-cooperative. The double arrows denote that communications between client
agents and the coordinator and between server agents and the coordinator are bidi-
rectional. (Other web topologies are clearly possible.)
A typical interaction will involve a client c making a request to the coordinator
for an action to be performed; the coordinator then broadcasts the request to the
subset S of server agents that permit c’s requested action to be performed. Each
server agent in S sends to  the optional, intended, empowered, authorized actions
that it will perform for c (in I-mode and C-mode). The coordinator , in turn,
communicates these options to c. If c wishes to commit to a proposed option ω then
c will request  to commit (atomically) a transaction to eﬀect ω. It is important to
note that a server agent of the e-cooperative may also be the coordinator of its own
e-cooperative. Hence, multiple e-cooperatives can be linked without restriction and
thus complex webs of e-cooperatives can be naturally represented
3.2 Permissions
In order to act on behalf of a client, a server agent s must have an intention to act
either individualistically (in I-mode) or cooperatively (in C-mode). The intentions
that an agent s of the e-cooperative has to act often depends on whether s is acting
in I-mode or C-mode (e.g., for an act of buying, the minimum value of a purchase
that is allowed by an agent s in I-mode may be less than s allows in C-mode).
In addition to declaring its intentions, each e-cooperative server agent s will
specify its own empowerments to act. That is, in addition to being willing to perform
a required action, a server agent s must also express its (current) capability of acting
in order for s to engage in satisfying c’s request that an action be performed. When
acting in I-mode, s must be able to satisfy a client’s request completely by acting
alone. In contrast, when acting in C-mode the agent s acts with other server agents
of the e-cooperative to satisfy a client’s request to perform action a. Of course, s
may be empowered to satisfy a client’s request in C-mode when it cannot satisfy
the client’s request in I-mode, but not vice-versa i.e., I-mode satisfaction implies
C-mode satisfaction, but not conversely.
An e-cooperative server agent s that has the intention of performing an action
a and that is empowered to do a for a client c must specify whether c should be
permitted to perform a when s is acting in I-mode and when s is acting in C-mode.
For that, the client’s status level is computed. In the case of I-mode authorization,
a single e-cooperative server agent s will determine whether c has the status to
perform a requested action or not. In contrast, in C-mode all of the server agents
s1, . . . , sn that act cooperatively to satisfy c’s request must agree that c has the
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status that si (1 ≤ i ≤ n) requires c to have in order to have performed whatever
action c has requested.
The combination of speciﬁcations of an intention policy and an empowerment
policy together with the status of the client c is used to deﬁne a set of triples (c, a, r),
which specify that the server agent s allows a client agent c the option of performing
the action a on resource r.
3.3 Group Ethos
In the EWE model, a permission must be consistent with the group ethos of the e-
cooperative. The group ethos determines what powers the server agents can exercise
in the context of the e-cooperative. We describe a simple form of group ethos such
that an e-cooperative server agent s acts to satisfy a request from a client c in full
by s operating alone whenever that is consistent with s’s speciﬁcations of intentions,
empowerments and authorizations. If s has an intention to act and authorizes c to
perform the requested act but s is not empowered to act then s will request other
server agents of the e-cooperative to help in satisfying c’s request. Hence, each server
agent of the e-cooperative will act in I-mode if possible and in C-mode otherwise.
Despite its simplicity, this group ethos is consistent with the concept of prospective
rationality that is deﬁned within the framework of Rational Choice [15]. Henceforth,
we will call this ethos the Principle of Maximal Individualistic Satisfaction, to wit:
If an e-cooperative server agent s intends and can fully satisfy a request of a
client c for an action to be performed that s authorizes for c then s will act in
an I-mode capacity (i.e., privately, selﬁshly) subject to any constraints on I-
mode action (conversely, s has the minimal commitment to act cooperatively).
Otherwise, s determines the maximal extent to which it can satisfy the request
by c, and will request help from other server agents of the e-cooperative on how
to satisfy the remainder of c’s request. In this case, the C-mode case, s invites
server agents of the e-cooperative to engage in joint activity to satisfy c’s request.
All server agents must respect the Principle of Maximal Individualistic Satisfac-
tion, the shared group ethos. Other forms of group ethos are, of course, possible
(e.g., to allow for group competitiveness); these alternatives are the basis for diﬀer-
ent ethoses that can, nevertheless, be naturally represented in our framework.
3.4 Events
The notion of an event is of primary importance in our approach. The importance
of the concept of events is emphasized by their widespread use in linguistics and
knowledge representation (e.g., in verb nominalization). Events provide a cate-
gorically homogeneous basis for representing change, a feature that is an essential
aspect of our EWE model.
We interpret events as happenings at an instance of time. We adopt a one-
dimensional, linear, discrete view of time, with a beginning and no end point. That
is, the model of time that we choose is a total ordering of time points that is
isomorphic to the natural numbers. In the ensuing discussion, we represent times
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as natural numbers in Y Y Y Y MMDD format. We assume that time is bidirectional
so that proactive and postactive changes may be made to represent EWE policy
requirements, and past, present and future times can be used to make decisions on
e-trading requests made by client agents.
EWE policy conditions will often need to be speciﬁed with respect to the current
time extracted from the system clock. For that, we utilize the auxiliary predicate
current time/1, which gives system clock times and has a ﬁxed interpretation such
that current time(T ) = true if T = now and false otherwise. The semantics of
now is deﬁned in [9].
4 EWE Model: Logical Axioms
In this section, we formally deﬁne the EWE model. We begin by describing some
of the key sets of constants in the alphabet that we use in the formulation of the
EWE model and EWE policies. Speciﬁcally, a single e-cooperative Γ will be deﬁned
in terms of an alphabet that includes:
• A countable set C of client identiﬁers for Γ, c, c0, c1, . . .
• A countable set L of client status levels, l, l0, l1, . . .
• A singleton set {γ} where γ is the unique identiﬁer of the coordinator for Γ.
• A countable set S of identiﬁers s, s0, s1, . . . of server agents of Γ.
• A countable set A of named atomic actions. Actions are strings that denote
actions of arbitrary complexity in a world of interest e.g., buy, sell, supply, hire,
. . .
• A countable set R of resource identiﬁers, r, r0, r1, . . .
• A countable set T of time points, t, t0, t1, . . .
• A countable set E of event identiﬁers, e, e0, e1, . . .
More formally, an e-cooperative Γ is a tree with the coordinator γ as the root
element and with a ﬁnite set of server agents s1, . . . , sn that are the descendants of
γ and that are either leaf nodes or the root of a subtree of Γ. In the latter case, si
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) is both a server agent of Γ and the coordinator of an e-cooperative Γ′
(Γ = Γ′). Notice too that, from the previous discussion, we have that C ∩ S = ∅,
γ ∈ C and γ ∈ S for Γ.
Next, we deﬁne the EWE model as a logical theory; henceforth, we use the term
EWE theory for any instance of a logical theory that is deﬁned in terms of the
EWE model. A EWE theory is expressed in terms of a ﬁnite set of IBLP rules.
From the previous discussion, it should be clear that a EWE theory consists of four
subtheories: a PER subtheory is the set of rules that is used by the e-cooperative
coordinator to deﬁne the set of actions permitted for client agents, INT is a theory
of intentions that server agents have to act (in I-mode and C-mode), EMP is a
logical theory that speciﬁes a server agent’s empowerment to act (in I-mode or C-
mode), and AUT H is a theory that deﬁnes authorized actions for clients (in I-mode
or C-mode).
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4.1 PER Theory
The PER sub-theory, that is maintained at the coordinator site for the e-
cooperative, consists of the following rules:
permission(C,A,R)← agent(S), sla(C,L), i permission(L,A,R, S).
permission(C,A,R)← agent(S), sla(C,L), c permission(L,A,R, S).
i permission(L,A,R, S)← i empowered(L,A,R) ⇐ Ei,
i intent(L,A,R) ⇐ Ii, i authorized(L,A,R) ⇐ Ai.
c permission(L,A,R, S)← c empowered(L,A,R) ⇐ Ec,
c intent(L,A,R) ⇐ Ic, c authorized(L,A,R) ⇐ Ac.
The meaning of permission/3 is that a client c has the option of performing the
action a on resource r if c is assigned the status l (as deﬁned by sla/2 where sla
is short for status level assignment) and some server agent s of the e-cooperative
(acting in I-mode) or some (ﬁnite) subset {s1, . . . , sn} of the set of server agents
of the e-cooperative (acting in C-mode) specify that clients with l status have the
option of performing the action a on r.
The i permission clause is used to specify that client c’s request to perform the
a action on resource r is satisﬁed by the e-cooperative server agent s ∈ S acting
in I-mode if, for l level clients of which c is one, s has the intention of performing
the action a on the resource r, in I-mode, s is empowered, in I-mode, to perform
the action a on r, and s authorizes c to perform the action a in I-mode. The
c permission clause speciﬁes that client c’s request to perform the a action on
resource r is satisﬁed by the e-cooperative server agent s acting in C-mode if, for
c’s status level assignment l, s has the intention of performing the action a on the
resource r, in C-mode, s is empowered, in C-mode, to perform the action a on r,
and s authorizes the performance of the requested action.
4.2 Event Representation
In the EWE model, the actions a client can perform will depend, in part, upon the
transactions the requester agent has engaged in with the e-cooperative. Transactions
are expressed via a set of application-speciﬁc security event descriptions (SEDs). 3
Deﬁnition 4.1 A security event description is a ﬁnite set of ground 2-place as-
sertions that describe an event, identiﬁed by ei, i ∈ N, and which includes three
necessary facts, and n non-necessary facts (n ≥ 0). A necessary fact in a security
3 We restrict attention to a simple form of security event description in this paper; however, more complex
forms of SEDs are possible e.g., events with duration.
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event description  is a fact that must appear in ; all other facts in an SED are
non-necessary.
The three necessary facts in a SED together with their intended meanings are
as follows (where MOD(EWE) denotes the IB stable model of a EWE theory):
• MOD(EWE) |= happens(ei, tj), the event ei happens at time tj.
• MOD(EWE) |= act(ei, al), the event ei involves an action al.
• MOD(EWE) |= agent(ei, cm), the event ei involves the client agent cm.
It follows from the discussion above that the happens(ei, tj), act(ei, al) and
agent(ei, cm) facts in an SED are used to represent a happening ei at a time tj
of act al performed by a client agent cm.
Example 4.2 Consider the SED,  = {happens(e1, 20080612); agent(e1, bob);
act(e1, buying); object(e1, widget); colour(e1, green); amount(e1, 1000)}. The facts
in  describe an event e1 that happens on 12th June, 2008, and involves the
agent Bob buying an amount of 1000 green widgets. The amount(e1, 1000),
object(e1, widget) and colour(e1, green) facts are non-necessary facts in .
It follows from the discussion above that we view events as structured and de-
scribed via the set of predicates that form a SED. We do not envisage SEDs includ-
ing adjectival or adverbial modiﬁers, and we assume that all distinctly named acts,
agents, objects, etc. denote distinct acts, agents, objects, respectively. Our binary
representation of the elements of an SED is motivated by Davidson’s work on event
semantics [11]. Henceforth, we call a ﬁnite set of SEDs {1, . . . , n} a history.
Recall that, in the EWE model, a client agent’s status is used to determine the
actions the client may perform. On that, a set Λ of axioms is used to specify the
assignment of a client agent to a status level; Λ is intended to capture the following
form of reasoning:
A client agent C is currently assigned the status level L if an event E1 happened
at a time T1, that is earlier than the current time T , and resulted in the initiation
of C’s assignment to L, and this assignment has not been ended before T as a
consequence of an event E2 happening at a time T2 in the interval [T1, T ] that
causes C’s assignment of the status level L to be terminated.
To capture the required form of reasoning, Λ includes the following axioms, Λ1
and Λ2, that deﬁne the predicates sla/2 and ended sla/4:
〈Λ1〉 sla(C,L)← current time(T ), agent(E1, C), happens(E1, T1),
act(E1, A), T1 ≤ T, sla init(E1, C,A, L, T1, T ),
not ended sla(C,L, T1, T ).
〈Λ2〉 ended sla(C,L, T1, T )← agent(E2, C), happens(E2, T2), act(E2, A),
sla term(E2, C,A, L, T1, T ), T1 ≤ T2, T2 ≤ T.
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The axioms Λ1 and Λ2 are part of the core set of axioms of the EWE model.
Notice too that our use of act(E1, A), agent(E1, C), and happens(E1, T1) in the
deﬁnition of Λ1 is based on our conception of an event, see Deﬁnition 4.1, and
emphasizes that we consider the act A a client agent C performs at a time T1 to
be necessary facts the description of an event E1.
The predicates sla init/6 and sla term/6 in Λ1 and Λ2, specify how the ac-
tions performed by a client agent C aﬀect the agent’s status level assignments.
The description of an agent’s history of actions is part of the application-speciﬁc
component of a formulation of a EWE policy. Each sla init(E1, C,A, L, T1, T )
deﬁnition expresses that, according to the information held in the system at time
T , an event E representing an action A by C at time T1 initiates a period of
time, starting at T1, during which C is assigned status level L. Each deﬁnition of
sla term(E2, C,A, L, T1, T ) expresses that an event E2, representing an action A
by a client C at time T , terminates a period of time during which C was assigned
status level L since T1.
From a history (of SEDs) and rules deﬁning status initiation and termination, a
client’s status may be determined by the coordinator of an e-collective. This status
is used to decide what actions a client agent is able to perform according to a EWE
speciﬁcation that deﬁnes a EWE policy for an e-collective.
5 EWE Model: Non-logical Axioms
In this section, we describe the non-logical axioms that are maintained by individual
web servers in an e-cooperative. We describe the diﬀerent sets of rules in terms of a
running example. The example is based on a simple form of e-cooperative with four
Web server agents that are identiﬁed by s1, s2, s3 and s4. We make the simplifying
assumptions that the only resource of interest to client agents is a part relation
and the only action of interest is an act of buying. Each server agent of an e-
cooperative, with an intention of satisfying a client’s request to buy some part, will
maintain its own version of part. In our example, the part relation has the structure
part(X1, X2, X3), where X1 ranges over a domain of part names, X2 ranges over
a domain of colors (of parts) and X3 is the quantity of colored parts. Of course,
relations may be far more complex than part/3 and many more relations and actions
will typically be involved in practice, but these extra complexities do not raise any
special issues. As a further simpliﬁcation, to reduce the number of predicates that
we use in our example policies, we ignore the issue of satisfying allowedness and
range-restriction conditions. The simple example of a EWE policy that we describe
in this section is presented with exposition as the main motivation.
Given a EWE policy speciﬁcation, a client c0 may make a request of the form
permission(c0, buy, part(p, c, q)). In this case, c0’s request is to know whether it is
permitted to buy q units worth of the p part colored c. On receiving c0’s request, the
coordinator for an e-cooperative will request the server agents of the e-cooperative to
evaluate c0’s request with respect to their declarations of intentions, empowerments,
and authorizations.
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5.1 INT Theory
An intention theory, INT , for a server agent s deﬁnes s’s intentions (if any) in
terms of an action a that s is willing to engage in on resource r in C-mode on behalf
of L-level clients (the c intent rules), to wit:
i intent(L,A,R)← C1i ⇐ υ1i , . . . , Cmi ⇐ υni .
c intent(L,A,R)← C1c ⇐ υ1c , . . . , Cmc ⇐ υnc .
Each i intent (c intent) clause speciﬁes that the e-cooperative server agent s has
an intention to perform an action a on resource r in I-mode (C-mode) on behalf of
client c with status L if the conjunction of conditions, C1i ⇐ υ1i , . . . , Cmi ⇐ υni
(C1c ⇐ υ1c , . . . , Cmc ⇐ υnc) is satisﬁed.
Example 5.1 Consider the following set of intention theories for the e-cooperative
server agents s1, s2, s3 and s4 such that these intention theories are identiﬁed as
INTs1, INTs2, INTs3, and INTs4, respectively:
INTs1 :=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
i intent(L, buy, part(X,Y, Z)).
c intent(L, buy, part(X,Y, Z))← Z > 1000.
INTs2 :=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
i intent(L, buy, part(widget, green, Z))← Z ≤ 1000, L > l2.
c intent(L, buy, part(widget, red, Z))← Z ≥ 50.
INTs3 :=
{
i intent(l0, A,R).
INTs4 :=
{
i intent(L,A,R)← current time(T ), T ≥ 20080601.
c intent(L,A,R)← current time(T ), T ≥ 20081001.
Here, INTs1 is a speciﬁcation of the intentions the e-cooperative server agent
s1 has of satisfying any client’s request to perform an act of buying in I-mode or in
C-mode provided that the total size of the order (in the latter case) is greater than
1000 units. INTs2 expresses s2’s intention to act individually to satisfy a request
from any client with greater than l2 status to buy if the request is for less than 1000
green widgets; c2 is also willing to act in C-mode to satisfy requests for sales of more
than 50 units worth of red widgets from clients with any status L. INTs3 expresses
that s3 is willing to satisfy any action on any resource without restriction, but only
in I-mode and only for the clients that have l0 status. Finally, INTs4 speciﬁes that
s4 is willing to satisfy any action requested by clients with status L on any resource
in I-mode as soon as s4 starts trading on 1st June 2008 and will act in C-mode four
months after starting to trade.
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5.1.1 EMP Theory
In addition to an INT theory, each server agent s of the e-cooperative will maintain
its own EMP theory. An EMP theory is a set of rules of the form:
i empowered(L,A,R)← C1i ⇐ υ1i , . . . , Cmi ⇐ υni .
c empowered(L,A,R)← C1c ⇐ υ1c , . . . , Cmc ⇐ υnc .
Each i empowered (c empowered) clause speciﬁes that s is empowered to per-
form the a action on resource r for client c in I-mode (C-mode) if the conjunction
of conditions C1i ⇐ υ1i , . . . , Cmi ⇐ υni (C1c ⇐ υ1c , . . . , Cmc ⇐ υnc) is satisﬁed.
In the absence of a deﬁnition of i empowered (c empowered), s is not empowered
to perform the action a on r for any client in I-mode (C-mode).
For an EMP theory, it is important to recognize that, in the case of C-mode
evaluation, at least one of the Cjc (1 ≤ j ≤ m) conditions is expressed in terms of
c permission (or permission). The reason for this should be noted: in the case
of C-mode evaluation, the evaluation of c empowered involves a server agent s of
the e-cooperative requesting the collaboration of other agents in the e-cooperative
(or another e-cooperative if the server agent of the e-collective γ is also a coordi-
nator for an e-collective γ′, γ = γ′) in satisfying the request that an a action be
performed in relation to resource r on behalf of the client c. Hence, a c permission
condition in the body of a c empowered clause is a recursive call that generates a
set of server agents of the e-cooperative (or another e-cooperative if a permission
condition is evaluated) that will collaborate with s to satisfy the request by c to
perform the action a on r. Hence, when s acts in C-mode then c requests to act
jointly with other e-cooperative server agents that also have an intention and are
empowered and authorized to perform the requested action. By the Principle of
Maximal Individualistic Satisfaction, a server agent s of the e-cooperative, which
acts collaboratively with other e-cooperative server agents, will oﬀer to satisfy a
client’s request to the maximal extent that is consistent with the permissions that
s deﬁnes.
Next, consider the EMP theories to be used with the INT theories, from Ex-
ample 5.1, and the application-speciﬁc information on the stock levels of colored
widgets held by the server agents s1, s2, s3 and s4 and stored in the IBLPs iden-
tiﬁed by υ1, υ2, υ3 and υ4, respectively, viz: υ1 := {stock(widget, green, 200)},
υ2 := {stock(widget, green, 100)}, υ3 := {stock(widget, green, 1000)}, and υ4 :=
{stock(widget, green, 150)}. Here, stock(r, c, q) ∈ υi iﬀ the e-cooperative server
agent si (1 ≤ i ≤ 4) has the quantity q of the resource of type r and of color c avail-
able in stock. (We assume that the stock relation used by diﬀerent e-cooperative
server agents has a common format, but this need not, of course, be the case.)
Example 5.2 Consider the following theories EMPs1, EMPs2, EMPs3, and
EMPs4, for the e-cooperative server agents s1, s2, s3 and s4, respectively. These
empowerment theories assume that the Principle of Maximal Satisfaction is to be
implemented. Two of the deﬁnitions involve e-cooperative server agents querying
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the coordinator (assumed to be referenced by κ) to generate C-mode responses:
EMPs1 :=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
i empowered(L, buy, part(X,Y, Z))← stock(X,Y, V ) ⇐ υ1, Z ≤ V.
c empowered(L, buy, part(X,Y, Z))← stock(X,Y, V ) ⇐ υ1, Z > V,
A = Z − V, c permission(L, buy, part(X,Y,A), S)⇐ κ,
S = s1.
EMPs2 :=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
i empowered(L, buy, part(X,Y, Z))← current time(T ),
month(T,M), 6 ≤M,M ≤ 9, stock(X,Y, V ) ⇐ υ2,
Z ≤ V,Z ≤ 500.
c empowered(L, buy, part(X,Y, Z))← Z ≥ 500,
permission(s2, buy, part(X,Y, Z)) ⇐ πs2 .
EMPs3 :=
{
i empowered(l0, buy, part(X,Y, Z))← stock(X,Y, V ) ⇐ υ3, Z ≤ V.
EMPs4 :=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
i empowered(L, buy, part(X,Y, Z))← stock(X,Y, V ) ⇐ υ4,
Z ≤ V,L ≥ l3.
c empowered(L, buy, part(X,Y, Z))← stock(X,Y, V ) ⇐ υ4,
Z > V,A = Z − V,
c permission(L, buy, part(X,Y,A), S)⇐ κ, S = s4.
Here, the agent s1 will act in I-mode for any client with status L if s1 is em-
powered to so act by having enough stock, as recorded in υ1, to satisfy the request to
perform an act of buying. Alternatively, if s1 cannot satisfy the request itself then
s1 will attempt to act in C-mode, with any other server agent of the e-cooperative,
to service c’s request. That is, s1 will adhere to the Principle of Maximal Individ-
ualistic Satisfaction and satisfy whatever it can of the request and will then ask for
assistance with the remainder. In contrast, s3 is only prepared to act in I-mode for
l0 level clients and if it has enough stock as recorded in υ3 to satisfy a buying request.
In I-mode, s2 is empowered to allow an act of buying subject to certain temporal
constraints being satisﬁed and for orders of less than 500 units. In the case where
a request is to buy more than 500 units, s2 will seek assistance from outside of the
e-cooperative by checking its permissions deﬁned at πs2 and requesting empowered
agents, to which s2 subcontracts “large” orders, to contribute to s2’s satisfaction of
a buying request. The empowerement theory for s4 is the same as s1’s empower-
ment theory except that s4 queries the e-cooperative server agents other than itself
in attempting to satisfy a client’s request, for clients with status L in the C-mode
case, and its empowerments in the I-mode case apply only to clients with status
greater than l3.
5.1.2 AUT H Theory
An AUT H theory is a set of rules for specifying whether s authorizes clients with
status l to perform an action a on an resource r when s is acting in I-mode or
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C-mode. These rules are of the following general form:
i authorized(L,A,R)← C1i ⇐ υ1i , . . . , Cmi ⇐ υni .
c authorized(L,A,R)← C1c ⇐ υ1c , . . . , Cmc ⇐ υnc .
Each i authorized (c authorized) clause speciﬁes that the server s authorizes
clients with status l to perform an action a on resource r in I-mode (C-mode) if the
conjunction of conditions C1i ⇐ υ1i , . . . , Cmi ⇐ υni (C1c ⇐ υ1c , . . . , Cmc ⇐ υnc)
is satisﬁed. In the absence of an i authorized (c authorized) deﬁnition, clients with
L status are not authorized by s to perform the action a on r when s is acting in
I-mode (C-mode).
Example 5.3 For the authorization subtheory that is used in our running example,
we make the simplifying assumption that all server agents of the e-collective use the
following deﬁnitions:
i authorized(L,A,R)← pla(L,A,R).
c authorized(L,A,R)← not dla(L,A,R).
That is, a client agent with status L is authorized by an e-collective server agent
s to perform the A action on resource R in I-mode if L-level clients are assigned
the A privilege on R. In contrast, a client agent with status L is authorized by
an e-collective server agent s to perform the A action on resource R in C-mode if
L-level agents are not denied the A privilege on R.
Any number of authorization theories of the type that we describe can, of course,
be ﬂexibly deﬁned.
6 Implementation Issues
In this section, we brieﬂy describe one candidate implementation (in Ciao Prolog [8])
of a EWE theory and some performance measures for the implementation.
For testing our implementation, we use the example EWE policies from Sec-
tion 5 (these policy speciﬁcations are directly executable in Ciao). The AUT H
subtheory that we use (cf. Example 5.3) includes 1000 pla deﬁnitions and 1000 dla
deﬁnitions that relate to the client c0; c0 is assigned to one status level to which
each pla and dla applies, none of which constrains access to data. Moreover, a
2000 event history of SEDs is used in testing. For distributed processing, each
p(t1, . . . , tn)⇐ c condition in an action control policy speciﬁcation is translated to
a :-use active module(c,[p/n,...]) directive where the active module c is ex-
ecuted at the si sites (1 ≤ i ≤ 4), which are remote from the coordinator site. Each
p(t1, . . . , tn)⇐X condition is mapped to a conjunction of conditions (where module
X is stored locally): consult(X), p(t1, . . . , tn).
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The set of refutations that are generated in a successful derivation for a client’s
request gives the possible ways of satisfying the request. Speciﬁcally, from each
refutation, the set of i permission and c permission atoms gives a candidate option
for satisfying the client’s request (cf. [4]).
Example 6.1 We consider two example requests, r1 and r2, issued on 1st July
2008 by the client c0 with status l0 to the e-cooperative with the agents identiﬁed
as s1, s2, s3 and s4:
r1 : permission(c0, buy, part(widget, green, 50)).
r2 : permission(c0, buy, part(widget, green, 250)).
The INT and EMP theories that are used in testing are from Example 5.1 and
Example 5.2, respectively. From the AUT H theory that we use, c0 is authorized
to buy any quantity of green widgets by s1, s2, s3 and s4 acting in I-mode or C-
mode. It follows that the candidate i permission and c permission atoms that are
generated by the e-cooperative coordinator, in response to the requests r1 and r2,
can be expressed, in disjunctive normal form, for l0 status level users of which c0 is
one, thus:
i permission(l0, buy, part(widget, green, 50), s1) ∨
i permission(l0, buy, part(widget, green, 50), s2) ∨
i permission(l0, buy, part(widget, green, 50), s3) ∨
i permission(l0, buy, part(widget, green, 50), s4).
i permission(l0, buy, part(widget, green, 250), s3) ∨
(i permission(l0, buy, part(widget, green, 200), s1) ∧
c permission(l0, buy, part(widget, green, 50), s4)) ∨
(i permission(l0, buy, part(widget, green, 150), s4) ∧
c permission(l0, buy, part(widget, green, 100), s1)).
The permissions are communicated to c0; each disjunct in one of the DNF for-
mulas above expresses a candidate option for satisfying c0’s request. From these
options, c0 will select the option (a transaction) it wishes to have performed (if any)
and informs the coordinator of its decision. The transaction that c0 wishes to have
performed is rechecked on receipt by the coordinator. If the permission holds for c0
at the time of the check then the coordinator commits the transaction atomically.
For testing, we initially evaluate r1 and r2 with respect to our example EWE
policy stored on a single machine. This enables CPU times for request evaluation
to be generated. We then repeat the evaluation when the intention, empowerment
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and authorization theories for s1, s2, s3 and s4 are remotely located (with respect
to the coordinator).
Our tests have been performed using a Sun Ray machine (a terminal to a Sun
Fire v-490 cluster with 8 CPUs and 10 Gbtye RAM) running Solaris 10 together with
a Toshiba Satellite Pro 2100 machine with an Intel Pentium 4, 1.9GHz processor
and 1Gbyte RAM. The two machines are connected over a 100Mbits per second
Ethernet LAN. The active modules are executables on the Satellite.
For the ﬁrst set of tests, using measures extracted from the built-in statistics
predicate, the evaluations of r1 and r2 take a few milleseconds of CPU time to
perform (averaged over 10 runs). For the second set of tests, we use walltime. For
these tests, walltime costing are of the order of 2-5 seconds (again averaged over 10
runs). These processing costs are within acceptable bounds given the “expensive
case” choices in testing (i.e., in practice, we do not envisage 2000 rules and a 2000
event history being accessed to evaluate the requests of a single client). In practice,
client “think time” [1] will dominate processing costs.
7 Related Work
The issue of developing policy speciﬁcation languages for Web and Semantic Web ap-
plications has received considerable attention in recent years. For example, Berners-
Lee [6] has proposed N3 and the related policy languages Rei and Rein. Moreover,
XACML [16], KAoS and RuleML [7] have been developed as languages for policy
speciﬁcation for Web-based applications. Rather than proposing another form of
policy language, the principal contribution of our approach is to deﬁne a general
model in terms of which a variety of web-based e-trading policies can be formally de-
ﬁned. Although, languages like XACML can be used to deﬁne business policies (and
access control policies, in particular), XACML is a language for policy speciﬁcation
rather than being a model in terms of which policy information is deﬁned. Similarly,
the work by Antoniou and Arief [2] is related to ours in the sense that a declara-
tive language for business rules for e-commerce is deﬁned, but again the emphasis
in [2] is on the language for policy speciﬁcation rather than the model that deﬁnes
the conceptual framework in terms of which the language is to be used. It should
also be noted that our model and the policy languages that it admits enables both
business rules and authorization policies to be deﬁned in a general framework. In
eﬀect, the authorization rules enable an access control policy to be deﬁned whereas
the intention and empowerment rules are of fundamental importance in expressing
business requirements.
The Ponder language [10] has been developed to enable a range of management
and security policies to be represented and incorporates a notion of events for de-
termining what actions are permissible (as we do). However, unlike our approach,
Ponder is a language-based approach for policy representation rather than being
model-based and the formal semantics of Ponder are not well deﬁned.
From the perspective of the access control community, we note that rule-based,
certiﬁcate-based languages have been proposed for distributed security policy speci-
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ﬁcation (e.g., SD3 [14] and Binder [12]). Nevertheless, these languages are concerned
with deﬁning authorization policies and (again) do not assume the existence of a
well-deﬁned model in terms of which authorization policies are deﬁned. In the ac-
cess control literature, there has been much more of an emphasis on the models for
centralized systems in terms of which languages for policy speciﬁcation are deﬁned.
For example, Barker and Stuckey [5] adopt a rule-based approach for formally spec-
ifying a family of policy languages from the deﬁnitions of conceptual models that
are related to the family of ANSI RBAC models [13]. Methodologically, our ap-
proach is of this same type as that used in [5]. However, we combine intentions and
empowerments with speciﬁcation of authorizations. In our proposal, speciﬁcations
of intentions and empowerments are not simply to be included as “side-conditions”
in terms of which authorizations are deﬁned. To the best of our knowledge, no
e-trading model has thus far been proposed that combines the concepts of server
agent intentions and empowerments and client event-based statuses to develop a
well-founded model of web-based e-trading that is grounded in a well-established
theory of cooperation.
8 Conclusions and Further Work
We have deﬁned formally the EWE model in terms of which policies for event-
oriented web-based e-trading can be deﬁned. The EWE model incorporates inten-
tional, empowered, authorized actions that apply to clients with diﬀerent statuses,
which are determined from the history of client engagement in e-trading. Server
agents of an e-cooperative may act individually or jointly and in a manner that is
consistent with a group ethos. Intentions, empowerments and authorizations are im-
portant in their own right for determining legitimate forms of access. However, they
become especially important to consider when server agents may act collaboratively
as well as individually to satisfy requests for action. In addition to being formally
well-deﬁned, the EWE model: enables changes to policies to be eﬀected dynami-
cally and autonomously; it makes it possible to treat individualistic and joint actions
and the combining of multiple actions and e-cooperatives in a completely uniform
manner (in both cases, by exploiting recursive deﬁnitions of empowerments); and it
permits properties of policies to be deﬁned and proven for assurance purposes. EWE
policies can also be eﬃciently implemented. Moreover, despite the complexities in-
volved in policy expression, EWE policies can be straightforwardly speciﬁed using a
declarative language (the EWE model is deﬁned by a small number of axioms that
can be specialized for application-speciﬁc requirements).
To simplify the discussion in this paper, we have described a simple EWE model
in terms of a basic form of group ethos and atomic events. It must be noted, how-
ever, that many forms of ethos and more complex forms of events can be naturally
accommodated in more powerful EWE models. In future work, we want to con-
sider other forms of group ethos (e.g., to allow for server agent competitiveness in
request servicing); we also intend to consider an enhanced form of the EWE model
on which constraints may be expressed to capture higher-level policy requirements.
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Other matters that demand attention include to consider the use of an XML-based
representation of EWE policies (cf. RuleML) and preference speciﬁcation on EWE
policy rules with rule conﬂict resolution strategies.
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